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CHOICE OF LAW: RULES OR APPROACH*
Willis L. M. Reeset
The principal question in choice of law today is whether we should
have rules or an approach. By "rule" is meant a phenomenon found in
most areas of the law, namely a formula which once applied will lead the
court to a conclusion. To be sure, there will inevitably be questions as to
a rule's proper scope of application, including questions of how the
words that comprise the rule should be defined or interpreted. Once
it has been decided what a rule means and how it should be applied,
however, a conclusion will be reached through the rule's application.
By "approach" is meant a system which does no more than state
what factor or factors should be considered in arriving at a conclusion.
An example of an approach is section 6 of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws which lists "factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law," but neither states how a particular choice of
law question should be decided in light of these factors nor what relative weight should be accorded them.' It should be added that there

0 This article is an amplified version of the fifty-fourth Frank Irvine Lecture delivered at Cornell University on April 21, 1971.
f' Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law and Director, Parker School of Foreign
and Comparative Law, Columbia University; Reporter, Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws. A.B. 1985, LL.B. 1988, Yale University.
I The black letter of this section reads as follows:
Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
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can be an approach, as opposed to a rule, in asituation where consideration is limited to a single factor. This is true, for example, of the principle so frequently voiced today by courts and writers that a court should
apply the law of the state which has the greatest concern in the determination of the particular issue.2 To identify this state it will usually
be necessary first to determine what policy or policies underlie the relevant local law rules of the potentially interested states. If the policy
underlying only one of these rules would be furthered by the rule's
application, the state having this rule is obviously the state of greatest
concern and this is the rule that should be applied. If, on the other hand,
the policies underlying the rules of two or more states would each be
furthered by their rule's application, the court will be faced with the
unenviable task of determining which of the states involved has the
greatest concern in the application of its rule.8 The problem is made
more acute by the fact that either different policies or policies of different intensity may underlie the identically worded statutes or decisional
rules of two or more states.&4 As a result, a decision involving a statute
or rule of one state will not be a conclusive precedent in a case involving even an identically worded statute or rule of another state. Clearly,
what is involved here is the very antithesis of a choice of law rule. Rather it is an approach which inevitably calls for decision case by case.
Rules are employed in most areas of the law. Indeed, throughout
the ages the development of rules has been one of the primary objectives
of the common law judge. This has been so because of the advantages
that rules bring. Perhaps the most obvious of these benefits are certainty and predictability, important factors not only for those planning
future transactions but also for those confronting either lawsuits or
problems of how much to offer or accept by way of settlement. An
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971).
Professor Robert Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" are essentially similar
to the factors listed in section 6 and provide another good example of an approach as
contrasted with a rule. These choice-influencing considerations are (1) predictability of
results, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) simplification of the
judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and (5) application
of the better rule of law. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 105 (1968).
2 See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1968);
A. VON MEmEN & D. TRAuTMAN, THE LAw OF MULTISTATE PRoBLms 341-76 (1965).
3 See generally A. VON MEHREN & D. TRATrmAN, supra note 2, at 392-94.
4 Compare Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965),
with Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); cf. Trautman, Kell v. Henderson:A Comment, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 465 (1967).
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equally important advantage of rules is the fact that they greatly facilitate the judicial task. All that a judge need do when deciding a question covered by a rule is to select the proper rule and then, after
gaining an understanding of its provisions, to apply it. By this process
he will be led to a conclusion. Far more difficult is the task of a judge
when an approach is involved. Here he is told simply to consider one
or more enumerated factors in arriving at his conclusion and usually
is given little, if any, guidance as to the relative weight he should
give these factors. As a result, each decision will be essentially ad hoc
and the judge will rarely be able to rely upon, or even to obtain much
guidance from, earlier opinions.
The task of the judge is peculiarly difficult when he is told without further direction to apply the law of the state with the greatest
concern in the decision of the particular issue. To ascertain what state
that is, first the judge usually must determine what policy or policies
underlie the relevant decisional or statutory local law rules of the
potentially interested states. This will often prove an onerous, difficult,
and frustrating task. Under the best of circumstances, the amount of
judicial time spent in trying to ferret out these policies is likely to be
considerable; after all possible work has been done, the exact nature
of these policies may still remain indeterminate.5 Committee reports
will usually not be available in the case of state statutes, with the
result that a conclusion about the underlying policy of a statute may
sometimes be based as much on surmise or hunch as on any logical
deduction. And even when committee reports are available, or when
the policy underlying a statute or decisional rule is otherwise ascertainable, it will often be difficult to refine the policy to the point of
being able to determine whether it would or would not be furthered
by the rule's application in a case involving foreign facts.
Suppose, by way of example, that state X has a Statute of Frauds
whose purpose is to protect persons against false claims. Suppose further that in state Y, which has no similar statute, a resident of state X
enters into an oral contract, calling for performance in X, with a resident of Y and thereafter sues him in X for nonperformance. Would
the policy underlying the X Statute of Frauds be furthered by its
application to provide the Y resident with a defense? It is highly un5 E.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969);
Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300
N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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likely that any committee report or other legislative document, even
if one were available, would cast any clear light on this question. 6
Where then should the court turn for guidance?
Suppose now that the court determines that the policies underlying the relevant rules of two or more states would each be served by
application of the rule. How is the court to determine which of the
states involved is that of primary concern? Any inquiry of this sort is
likely to involve the court in, among other things, the often impossible
task of ascertaining the relative strength or weakness of the policies involved.7 And if the court were to find that two or more of these policies
were of approximately equal strength, it would be faced with the
further problem of determining on some rational basis why one of
these policies should be furthered at the expense of the other.
The difficulties involved in applying the law of the state with the
greatest concern in the decision of the particular issue are well illustrated by the experience of the New York Court of Appeals. This court
8
was the first clearly to espouse this approach in Babcock v. Jackson
and has probably remained its most ardent advocate. Since the time
of Babcock, because of the uncertainty and unpredictability it engendered, the court has been deluged by appeals and wracked by dissent.9 Also it seems fair to surmise that the number of choice of law
cases brought before the lower New York courts has vastly increased.
The problems posed by choice of law are similar to those found
in other legal areas. Policies underlie and are responsible for all rules
of law. It is the policy which first comes to light. Thereafter, the policy
may be embodied in a statute or it may be given effect by judicial
decision. Policies are difficult to apply in their raw state, since their
proper range of application may be uncertain. Even more importantly,
a policy rarely stands alone; there will usually be one or more countervailing policies and consequently there will be the problem of determining the extent to which one policy should be furthered at the
expense of another. The task of defining the policy's scope of application or of providing proper accommodation for conflicting policies
bears close analogy to the choice of law problem of determining how
best to accommodate multistate and local law policies, including the
question of which state has the greatest concern in the decision of the
6 See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d
576, 800 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
7 See Trautman, supra note 4.
8 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
9 See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 NXE.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968);
Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
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particular issue. In at least most areas of the law. the constant aim of
the courts has been to translate policies into rules as quickly as possible
for the reason, among others, that rules are more precise and hence
provide greater certainty and predictability than do policies and also
are far easier for the courts to apply. Should the aim of the courts not
be the same in choice of law? It is the opinion of the writer that this
question should be answered in the affirmative and that the development of rules should be as much an objective in choice of law as it is
in other areas. The remainder of this article will be devoted to a discussion of why it is that rules are currently in such low repute in choice
of law, what should be done pending the development of new rules,
and what are some of the means by which satisfactory choice of law rules
may be developed.
The current unpopularity of rules in choice of law is believed to
be primarily an overreaction to the failure of previous attempts at rulemaking in tort and contract. These rules were few in number and allembracing in character. Essentially there was but one rule in tort,
namely, that a person's rights and liabilities should be determined by
the law of the state where defendant's allegedly tortious act first caused
injury to plaintiff.10 There were two rules in contract. The first was
that issues relating to the validity of a contract should be governed by
the law of the state of contracting, which was the state where the final
act necessary to create a binding contract occurred." The second was
that issues of performance, as contrasted to validity, should be gov2
erned by the law of the state where performance was to take place.'
In retrospect, it is not surprising that these rules have been largely
abandoned by the courts. There are many different issues in tort and
contract, and in local law there are many different rules to govern these
issues. Moreover, the state with the greatest concern in the decision
of the case will not remain constant but will vary with the particular
issue and with the particular grouping of contacts. It would have been
miraculous under these circumstances if the myriad choice of law
problems that have arisen in these two areas could have been handled
satisfactorily by one or two simple, hard and fast rules. That this has
not proven to be the case does not mean, however, that satisfactory
rules cannot be devised to govern choice of law problems in these two
areas. It means only that rules similar in character to those previously
attempted are unlikely to prove successful.
,10 RESrATEmmNT oF CoNfmcr oF LAws

11 Id. § 332.
12 Id. § 358.

§§ 377-79

(1934).
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This is not meant to suggest that all-embracing choice of law rules
can never be successful. It is still the rule, for example, that issues
relating to the transfer of interests in land are determined by the law
that would be applied by the courts of the situs. 13 It is clear, however,
that this rule is supported by considerations that do not apply to the
choice of law rules developed in tort and contract. The state of the
situs is the state with the greatest concern in the determination of many
issues relating to the transfer of interests in land. 14 Also problems of
title search will be greatly facilitated by the consistent application of
the law of the situs to all such issues. 15 There may also be instances
where application of a simple, all-embracing rule of choice of law is
supported by an overriding need for uniformity of result. This, it is
thought, is the prime justification of the rule that issues of succession
to movables are determined by the law of the state where the decedent
was domiciled at the time of his death.'8 Be this as it may, the challenge
to the desirability of choice of law rules has to date been made primarily in the areas of tort and contract. To these two areas the remainder of this article will be mainly directed.
Bad rules may well be worse than no rules at all. In any event,
bad rules are likely to be avoided or overturned by the courts and
hence are unlikely to produce predictability and uniformity of result.
Rules are bad if they do not properly give effect to the policies involved,
or if they are phrased so broadly as to be applicable to situations involving policies different from those the rules were designed to implement. The choice of law rules for tort and contract were bad primarily
for the first reason. They were derived from the vested rights theory,
that is, the theory that the applicable law should be that of the state
where occurred the last event necessary to bring a legal right and a
corresponding legal obligation into existence. This theory, it seems
clear, gives little consideration to the multistate and local law policies
that are likely to be involved in a choice of law question in tort or
contract. The state of the last event is unlikely for this reason alone to
be the state with the greatest concern in the decision of the particular
issue.17 Similarly, there will be situations where application of the
relevant local law rule of this state would not further the policy underlying the rule and would be inconsistent with other multistate and
13 REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLicr OF LAWS § 223 (1971).

14 See text accompanying note 41 infra.
15 RESTATEMdENT (SECOND) OF CONrmcr OF LAws § 223, comment b at 11 (1971).

18 Id. §§ 260, 263; but cf. Yiannopoulos, Wills of Movables and American International Conflicts Law: A Critique of the Domiciliary"Rule," 46 CAmF. L. REV. 185 (1958).
17 See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Fox v. Morrison
Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971).
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local law principles.' 8 To be sure, application of the law of the place
of the last event is easy for the court and provides predictability and
uniformity of result. But these advantages are bought at the sacrifice
of other policies, a price the courts have been unwilling to pay.'19 Further, there is no reason to suppose that predictability, uniformity of
result, and ease of application could not be achieved by rules of a
different type which would give greater effect to other relevant policies.
Rules may also be bad because they are phrased so broadly as to be
applicable to situations involving policies different from those the
rules were designed to implement. Take, for example, the question of
interspousal immunity. It has been said that the applicable law should
be that of the state of the spouses' common domicile on the ground that
this is the state with the greatest concern in the determination of this
particular issue. 20 The rule makes good sense when applied to a suit
involving only the spouses, and it seems clear that this was the sole situation envisaged by the originators of the rule. Literally, however, the
rule would also apply to a situation where the wife initially brings
suit against a third person and he in turn seeks contribution from the
husband on the ground that the latter's negligence contributed to the
wife's injuries. In this situation, denial of the claim for contribution by
reason of a rule of interspousal immunity in force in the state of the
spouses' common domicile might well be unfair to the third person if
the accident occurred in a state having no such rule, particularly if the
third person were domiciled in that state. 21
It is doubtful whether we are now in a position to frame many
good choice of law rules in either tort or contract. Both fields are vast
and many of their segments remain relatively unexplored. Yet courts
and writers should attempt to discern issues that could in all probability
be governed satisfactorily by a particular rule of choice of law. Indeed,
the task has already been begun. A handful of narrow choice of law
rules have been developed which have the overwhelming support of
the courts.22 Other such rules have been suggested in isolated judicial
opinions 23 and in legal articles.24 Still others are ripe for fashioning. Of

Is

See notes 5, 9 & 17 supra.

19 The place of injury rule has, for example, been abandoned in the great majority
of recent cases. Weintraub, The Emerging Problems in Judicial Administration of a StateInterest Analysis of Tort Conflict of Laws Problems, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 878 (1971).
20 Haumscbild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
21 See, e.g., Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
22

See text accompanying notes 41-60 infra.

23 See, e.g., the choice of law rules for guest-passenger situations set forth by Chief

Judge Fuld in his concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 249 N1.2d
894, 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532-33 (1969).
24 E.g., the choice of law rules for damage limitations in wrongful death actions sug-
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course, there can be no complete assurance that a newly formulated
rule will work well in actual practice. But the risk of failure should not
deter an attempt at rule making in choice of law-just as it does not do
so in other areas of the common law-whenever there is a good basis
for the belief that a proposed rule would lead to good results under
most circumstances. And a rule which has proved its worth in practice
should not be refused application in a case that falls within its proper
scope merely because it would lead in that case to a result that might be
thought unfortunate. More specifically, the fact that a choice of law
rule which has stood the test of experience would lead on some rare
occasion to the application of the law of a state which is not that of
greatest concern, or would result in the disregard of other multistate or
local law policies, is not an adequate reason why the rule should not be
applied on that occasion. Perfection is not for this world. The advantages which good rules bring are worth the price of an occasional doubtful result.2 5
Pending the development of rules, the courts, in the absence of a
statutory directive to the contrary, should look in each case to the basic
policies involved and strive to reach the result that would best implement these policies. In choice of law, the basic policies are both multistate and local in character. Among the multistate policies are furtherance of the needs of the interstate and international legal systems,
application of the law of the state with the greatest concern in the
issue, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and easy
determination and application of the pertinent law. Among the local
law policies are protection of the justified interests of the parties
and implementation of the basic policies underlying the particular
field of local law.26
Application of the relevant local law rule of the state with greatest concern in the particular issue requires some further discussion.
The process of ascertaining this state is likely to prove both difficult
and frustrating.27 Yet there is one mitigating factor. This is that, in
accordance with the view here taken, application of the relevant local
law rule of the state of greatest concern is only one of several choice of
law policies and not necessarily the most important. Accordingly, the
search for this state can properly be abandoned in situations where the
court finds that the task would be disproportionately time consuming
gested in Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.LA.L. Rav. 641, 646-47

(1968).
25 See id. at 644.
26 See note 1 supra.
27 Text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
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or that there is no sound basis for determining the exact nature or
relative strength of the policies underlying some of the potentially
applicable local law rules. In such situations, it would be wise for the
court to confine its efforts to implementing other choice of law policies.
Rules should emerge in choice of law the same way they do in other
areas of common law. It is to be expected that, as cases are decided by
reference to the underlying policies, issues which can apparently be
regulated satisfactorily by a given rule will gradually appear. Upon
the appearance of such an issue, the attempt should be made to formulate a suitable rule, as recently done by Chief Judge Fuld in the area of
guest statutes.28 Once the proposed rule has been formulated, its merits
will, of course, thereafter be tested in subsequent cases. If the rule in
either its original or an amended form survives this testing, it will take
its place among those common law rules, whether of choice of law or
otherwise, that are applied more or less automatically by the courts to
situations falling within their literal terms.
This rule-making process would be aided immeasurably if the
courts were always to give their real reasons for arriving at a particular
result. The reasoning of a judge should be of material assistance to
those who follow in his footsteps. Reasons that prove to be bad will no
longer be employed and will render suspect the results to which they
led. On the other hand, reasons that prove to be good will be relied
upon in the further development of rules. Unfortunately, like other
humans, judges do not always give the true reasons for their decisions.
It is suggested, for example, that courts sometimes attribute a policy
to a statute or decisional rule in order to arrive at a result which they
have already decided to reach for other reasons. Opinions ostensibly
based upon such false reasoning are likely to mislead other courts and
litigants and to impede the development of the law.
There is an intermediate stage between the time when decisions
are derived directly from the underlying policies and when precise
rules are formulated. At this stage, knowledge has progressed to the
point where it can be said that a given issue or category of issues will
usually be decided in a particular way, even though it is impossible to
determine just when exceptional situations may occur. Hence all that
can be done is to state a general principle that is subject to an imprecise
exception. Despite its obvious limitations, such a principle is far better
than nothing at all, since it affords some certainty and predictability as
well as some guidance for the courts. With such a principle in hand, it
28 Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 583, 585, 249 N.E.2d 394, 403, 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d
519, 531, 532-83 (1969) (concurring opinion).
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may no longer always be necessary for courts and lawyers to look to the
underlying policies in arriving at a decision. And when they do look to
these policies, they will do so with the advantage of knowing that in at
least the majority of situations these policies will point to a particulai
result.
It may be that at the present time most areas of choice of law can
be usefully covered by principles of this sort. Professor Cavers has
suggested that pending the development of narrow, precise rules, the
courts should seek to construct what he calls broad "principle[s] of
preference." 29 As their name implies, these principles are not to be
considered immutable, but rather guides for decision to be followed
except where important considerations peculiar to a particular case
point in a different direction. They should be formulated with a view
towards doing justice to the parties3 0 and affording a means either to
"greflect relevant multistate policies or provide the basis for a reasonable
accommodation of the laws' conflicting purposes." 31 The development
and testing of these principles should, in Professor Cavers's opinion, be
facilitated by their breadth, since cases falling within their scope can be
expected to occur far more frequently than would cases directed to a
32
more narrow problem.
General principles of a different sort are contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. These provide that the law of a given
state will be applied, "unless, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship" to the parties and the
8
occurrence, in which event the law of the other state will be applied.
These principles have widely differing ranges of application. For example, the Restatement (Second) states broadly that issues arising from
tortious injuries to persons or to tangible property are determined by
the law of the state where the injury occurred unless some other state
happens to be that of most significant relationship. 4 On the other hand,
narrower formulations are found in the contracts area where an attempt
is made to state rules for various kinds of contracts.3 5 For example, in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, issues involving a contract for the transfer of an interest in land are determined by
124 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CAvms].
Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 132-33.
E.g., RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICt OF LAws § 189 (1971).
34 Id. §§ 14647.
85 Id. §§ 189-97.
29 D. CAVERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCES

so
81
82
38
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the law of the state where the land is situated, unless another state is
that of most significant relationship.8 6
These general principles of the Restatement (Second) do provide
some guidance, since they indicate that usually the law of a particular
state will be applied. On the other hand, they frequently fail to detail
exactly when some other state will be that of most significant relationship and hence the state of the applicable law. On occasion, little more
is said than that whether an exceptional situation exists and if so which
is the state of most significant relationship should be determined in
light of the factors set forth in section 6. 3 7 This section, it will be recalled, lists what are considered to be the most important choice of law
factors. It does not say, however, how a particular question of choice of
law should be decided in light of these factors or what relative weight
should be accorded them. The Restatement (Second) may also serve to
illustrate that it is possible to experiment with principles of different
degrees of generality. It may well be that the progression from ad hoc
decisions to precise rules will start with principles of great generality
and then proceed through principles of ever increasing specificity until
at last the time is reached for rule making.
We now return to the process which, it is believed, should be followed in the formulation of rules of choice of law. To be successful,
such rules must satisfactorily implement the multistate and local law
policies involved. It is unlikely that rules of wide application can
attain this objective in torts and contracts and in many other areas of
choice of law. This is so, among other reasons, because most areas of the
law contain a multitude of local law rules embodying different policies,
because the grouping of relevant contacts may vary widely from case to
case, and because in many areas the state of greatest concern is likely to
vary with the particular issue. More hope for success should be afforded
by a relatively large number of narrow rules, each of which would be
concerned with a particular issue or a group of closely related issues.
One should start with a particular issue and attempt to formulate
a choice of law rule that will satisfactorily regulate this issue. Hopefully, it may eventually prove feasible to have a group of issues covered
by a single rule. But one should not apply a rule fashioned for a particular issue to another until there is a fair basis for supposing that the
rule which satisfactorily accommodates the policies underlying the
first issue will also accommodate those underlying the second. The
86 Id. § 189.
8T Note 1 supra.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57: 315

danger of carrying over a choice of law rule from one issue
to another presenting different considerations is well illustrated by
NationalShawmut Bank v. Cumming38 which concerned the validity of
an inter vivos trust. It had become well settled prior to that case that in
the absence of a choice of law provision in the trust instrument, the
validity of an inter vivos trust of movables would be upheld with
respect to issues involving the rules against perpetuities and accumulations if the trust satisfied the requirements of the state where it was to
be administered. 9 This rule makes good sense as far as these two issues
are concerned. Protection of the expectations of the settlor by applying
a law upholding the validity of the trust is an obvious desideratum.
And this is especially true in the case of issues involving the rules
against perpetuities and accumulations, since these rules are likely to
stem from the same policies in all interested states and to differ among
themselves only in matters of degree. Application of the law of the state
of administration, where this will result in upholding the trust, in these
circumstances is a satisfactory accommodation of the relevant policies:
the expectations of the settlor are protected, the law of a state having a
close relation to the trust is applied, and the policy of other states will
not seriously be affronted by such application. Quite different was the
issue in the Cumming case where a Vermont settlor established an
inter vivos trust of movables in Massachusetts. Following his death, his
widow sought to have the trust declared invalid under Vermont law on
the ground that it had been made for the purpose of depriving her of
inheritance rights. Nevertheless, the trust was upheld on the ground
that it was valid under the law of Massachusetts, the state of administration. Here Vermont was the state with the greatest concern in the issue
to be decided and there was a marked difference in policy as to that
issue between Vermont and Massachusetts. It was dubious wisdom to
apply in that case a rule originally formulated to deal with issues of
perpetuities and accumulations.
Once an issue has been selected as a candidate for rule making, one
should seek to determine whether in the great majority of situations a
particular state will be that of greatest concern by reason of a particular
contact irrespective of all other considerations, including the content
of its relevant local law rule.40 If so, it would usually be appropriate for
88

325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950).

89 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270, comment c (1971).

40 Ascertainment of the state of greatest concern will not in this situation involve the
difficulties discussed in the text accompanying notes 5-9 supra. This is because we are
here concerned with the rare situation where a state will be that of greatest concern
without regard to the content of its local law rule. Hence it will not be necessary in these
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a:iule to provide for the application of this state's law to the -particular
issue. This is undoubtedly the explanation and justification for the
rule that the law of the situs will be applied to determine issues such as
who may own land, the conditions under which land may be held, and
the uses to which land may be put.41 Clearly the state of the situs is the
state with the greatest concern in the decision of such issues. Another
group of issues that has received similar treatment involves the manner,
method, and time of performance of a contract.4 Such matters are of
greatest concern to the state where the acts are performed, and the rule
has long been that the law of this state should be applied. Whether one
member of a family is immune from tort liability to another member of
the family may be a further issue that, for similar reasons, can satisfactorily be regulated by a hard and fast choice of law rule.43 The problem
arises whiere injury occurs in a state other than that of the common
domicile and where the relevant rules of the two states differ. There are
two possible situations. One is when there is no immunity under the
law of the state of domicile but where immunity is granted by the law
of the state of injury. The second situation occurs when the immunity
rules are reversed. Intrafamily immunity is normally accorded by a
common law rule whose underlying policy is obscure. Reasons frequently advanced to explain the grant of such immunity are the common law doctrine of the legal identity of spouses, the desire to foster
and preserve marital harmony and pifrental discipline, and the desire to
protect insurance companies from false claims. 44 All of these policies
point to the state of domicile as being that of greatest concern and
would support a rule calling for application of that state's law. To be
sure, cases may arise where the parties' relationship to their domicile
is not particularly dose or where the state of injury, in a case in which
it does not grant immunity, would have a substantial interest in having
its rule applied to afford recovery to the injured person. The question
is whether the benefits of having a hard and fast rule would not outweigh the disadvantages which the rule might be thought to entail in
45
an exceptional situation.
situations to investigate the poliies underlying the relevant local law rules of the potentially interested states.
41 RESTATEM:ENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCr OF LAWS § 223, comment b (1971).
42 Id. § 206.
43 Cf. id. § 169.
44 Id. § 169, comment b.

45 For a general discussion see Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents
in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv.
897 (1954); Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye 1931-1959: Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 237 (1962); Jayme, Inter-
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Issues involving other immunities from tort liability may call for
a similar rule. Much can be said, for example, in support of a rule that
the law of the common domicile of guest and host driver should be
applied to determine whether the guest should be required to show
more than ordinary negligence in order to recover from the host. 46 To
be sure, the state of injury may have a legitimate interest in having its
own rule on this issue applied, but this interest is unlikely to exceed in
intensity that of the state of common domicile. A useful rule might
also be that where the parties to a tort action have a common domicile
the law of this state should be applied to determine issues relating to
the measure of damages 47 or to survival of actions.48 These too are issues
as to which the state of common domicile will almost certainly have a
far greater interest than the state of conduct and injury, whose primary
concern in the case of nonresidents will relate only to the application
of such of its rules as involve standards of conduct. Of course, application of the law of the state of common domicile will not cause joy
where the forum believes that the rules of this state as to the measure of
damages or survival of actions afford inadequate protection. Again
there is the question of what price one should be willing to pay for a
rule.
In all probability, there are not many issues as to which one state
will be that of greatest concern by reason of a particular contact alone.
There will be other issues as to which a state will, in the great majority
of situations, occupy this position if in addition to a particular contact
it has a particular local law rule. For example, the state where a person
acts will almost certainly have the greatest concern in the application
of its tort rule relating to standards of conduct, provided that the act
did not measure up to the pertinent standard. All states seek to impose
acceptable standards of conduct upon persons who act within their
territory, and conformity with such standards will be encouraged
if tort liability is imposed upon those who do not conform and as a consequence cause injury either in the state where they acted or elsewhere.
Likewise, it is difficult to see how the interests of other states could
spousal Immunity: Revolution and Counterrevolution in American Tort Conflicts, 40
S. CA.. L. Rxv. 307 (1967); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts,
48 CoaNEz., L.Q. 215, 217-20 (1963).
46 See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 583, 585, 249 NE.2d 394, 403, 404, S01
N.Y.S.2d 519, 531, 532-33 (1969) (concurring opinion).
47 See, e.g., Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); see also
CAvEs 157-58.
48 See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); see also CAVERs
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adversely be affected by the application of this rule. The situation that
initially might give pause is where the defendant's act caused injury
only in a second state and did not violate that state's acceptable standards of behavior. On reflection, however, it is difficult to see how this
second state could have a legitimate interest in exculpating the defendant for an act done outside its territory or how it could reasonably
object to the injured plaintiff being granted greater protection than
he would receive under its own law. The problem is different in the
converse situation where the act conformed to acceptable standards in
the state where it was done but did not meet the standards of the state
where it caused injury. Here the state of injury has an obvious interest
in having its law applied to afford relief to the injured person. Whether
application of this law would seriously affect the interests of the state
where the act was done would depend upon whether that state actually
wished to encourage the doing of the act or, as would more probably
be the case, simply viewed the act with less disapprobation than did
the state of injury. Undoubtedly there would also be circumstances
where imposing liability under the law of the state of injury would be
unfair to a person who had acted in another state and perhaps in reliance on that other state's law. All in all, it would seem the course of
wisdom at the present time not to attempt to state a rule covering the
situation where the act is tortious under the law of the state of injury
but not under the law of the state where it was done.
Protection of the natural expectations of the parties is a factor
which, when considered with certain contacts, may lead to the formulation of still other rules of choice of law. As used here, the term "natural
expectations" includes not only the expectations that the parties actually had prior to entering into a transaction or the occurrence of some
other event, but also the expectations that they presumably would have
had if their minds had been directed to the issue at hand. Expectations
of the first type are often encountered in such areas as contracts, trusts,
and marriage. Expectations of the second type are also significant. To
foster public confidence and respect, it is important that the law reach
results appealing to common sense, and a person is likely to think that
a result makes sense if it is one he would have anticipated had he
thought about the question beforehand. 49 This, of course, is as true in
choice of law as it is in any other legal field. It is desirable, in other
words, that a person's rights and duties should be determined under a
49 See Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 23, 27-28, 237 N.E2d 877, 883, 886, 290 N.YS.2d
784, 743, 747 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
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law whose application he had reason to expect. This consideration
supports a rule that a person who acts and causes injury in the state of
his domicile should not be subjected to a higher measure of responsibility in tort than would be imposed by the law of that state.5 0 In all
probability, a person in such a position would be surprised by the
application of some other law. And surely he would feel aggrieved if
he were subjected to a greater measure of liability by application of
another state's law simply because he had happened to injure in the
state of his domicile a resident of that other state. This result can also
be supported on the basis of state interests, since the state of the person's domicile would have an obvious concern in his welfare and in
events that transpired within its territory. Conversely and for similar
reasons, much can be said in support of a rule that a person who sustains
injury in the state of his domicile by reason of an act which occurred
there should not receive less protection than would be accorded him by
that state's law. 51
Another significant factor is that, to the extent made possible by
other considerations, a choice of law rule should seek to further the
basic policy underlying the substantive law field with which it is concerned. To date, this factor has had its principal impact upon choice of
law rules relating to marriage, contracts, and trusts. The basic policy
underlying the substantive law in each of these fields is protection of
the expectations of the parties, which in their most elemental form are
that the particular marriage, contract, or trust is valid and effective.
These are expectations which the parties actually had prior to their
entry into the particular transaction. At the present stage of development, these expectations are usually reflected in choice of law principles
that are subject to an imprecise exception. A marriage which is valid
under the law of the state of celebration, for example, will so be considered everywhere unless it violates the strong public policy of the state
which has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage. 52 A law which would invalidate a contract will not be applied
"unless the value of protecting the expectations of the parties is substantially outweighed in the particular case by the interest of the state with
the invalidating rule in having this rule applied.153 And the law chosen
50 See Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966); Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do
sul, SA., 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 859 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. C&vERs
146-50; Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 646-47.
61 Cf. CAvas 139-45; Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 646-47.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 288 (1971).
53

Id.

§ 188, comment b at 577.
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by the parties will be applied to determine their rights- and liabilities
under a contract, unless among other exceptions this would violate "a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
...would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties."5 4
On the other hand, there are situations where the value of protecting the expectations of the parties has led to the formulation of precise
rules of choice of law. The validity of an inter vivos trust of movables
will be upheld, with respect to issues involving the rules against perpetuities and accumulations, if the trust meets the requirements of the
state of administration, at least in the absence of a choice of law provision to the contrary in the trust instrument. 55 For similar reasons the
validity of a testamentary trust of movables will be upheld with respect
to the same issues, again in the absence of a choice of law provision in
the trust instrument, if the trust is valid under either the law of the
state of administration or that of the state where the testator was
domiciled at the time of his death.5 6 Usury provides another example
of an issue where the value of protecting expectations has led to a fairly
precise rule. So far as is known, all common law states have rules
against usury, and usually the permissible rate of interest will differ
only slightly from state to state. Consequently, as a general rule it is
deemed more important to uphold the contract and thus protect the
expectations of the parties than to apply the prohibitions against usury
of any particular state. The rule is to the effect that the "validity of a
contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract
has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate
permitted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law .... ."57 To be sure, this rule lacks some precision by reason
of its use of the words "substantial relationship" and "not greatly in
excess." Nevertheless, it does provide a considerable measure of predictability and uniformity of result.
Capacity is another issue where it may be possible to state a precise rule to the effect that a person will be held to have capacity to
contract if he has such capacity under the law of the state of his domicile. At least in the great majority of situations, this state will be the
54
55
56
57

Id. § 187.
See text accompanying note S9 supra.
RmSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 269 (1971).

Id. § 203.
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one most concerned with that person's protection; if it chooses to vest
him with contractual capacity, there would be little reason to deprive
him of that capacity by application of some other state's law.58 A case
that might initially give pause is one in which a person, vested with
contractual capacity by the state of his domicile, enters a contract centered in a second state under whose law he lacks capacity. This second
state, however, would have little interest in applying its law to deprive
him of capacity since he is not a domiciliary. On the other hand, this
second state could hardly justify upholding the contract by reason of
its interest in the other party to the contract, since its own rule of incapacity makes clear that it was prepared to sacrifice that party's interest
to what it deemed to be a more important principle. Similarly, fairness
to the other party could hardly explain a refusal to apply the rule of
incapacity of the second state, since this rule would undoubtedly have
been applied if the first person had been a local domiciliary. The best,
and most convincing, explanation for a refusal to apply the rule of
incapacity in this situation is the choice of law policy that the expectations of the parties should be protected whenever the significant interests of the states concerned do not require otherwise.
Workmen's compensation provides an additional example of how
the basic policy underlying a field can aid in the formulation of choice
of law rules. The policy here is twofold in nature, namely (1) that the
employee should be compensated, regardless of fault, for all injuries
received in the course of his employment and (2) that as a quid pro quo
the employer, and sometimes certain other persons as well, should be
liable for the employee's injuries only in accordance with a fixed scale
of damages and should be relieved from liability in tort or wrongful
death.5 9 These policies are responsible for the choice of law rule that
a state will not apply its law to hold a person liable in tort or wrongful
death for an employee's injuries, if that person is declared immune
from such liability by the law of a state under which he was required
to insure against the particular risk for the employee's benefit, and
provided that this is the state (1) where the injury occurred, or (2) where
the employment is principally located, or (3) from which the employer
supervised the employee's activities, or (4) whose local law governs the
employment contract, or (5) whose workmen's compensation statute
is stated in the employment contract to be the statute governing the
employee's rights.60
58 Cf. id. § 198.
59 Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958).
60 RRSrATEMdENT (SECOND) OF CoNFMCr OF LAWS § 184 (1971).
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In contrast to contracts, trusts, and workmen's compensation, 6 '
formulation of choice of law rules in torts is impeded by the fact that
no single policy is commonly recognized as most important. To date,
it has been generally believed that all or nearly all tort rules are the
product in varying and uncertain degree of at least two policies, compensation for the victim and deterrence of the wrongdoer.6 2 In this
day of widespread insurance, however, the policy of providing compensation for the victim enjoys increasing importance, and the time
may come when it is recognized that this is the basic policy underlying
at least the area of unintentional torts. Indeed, it may be noteworthy
that the great majority of the recent choice of law decisions involving
unintentional tortious injuries have applied a law favorable to the
plaintiff. It may be, in other words, that the policy favoring compensation is already sub silentio at work. 3 In any event, the time may come
when this policy will play an important role in the formulation of
precise choice of law rules for torts.
CONCLUSION

No attempt has been made in this article to state all the precise
choice of law rules that it is currently possible to frame. What has been
done is (1) to suggest that the formulation of rules should be as much
an objective in choice of law as it is in other areas of the law, and (2) to
give some insight into what should be the rule-making process.
Rules are the product of policies, and it is unwise to seek to formulate a rule until the nature and range of the policies it embodies are
well understood. One must start with an issue and its underlying
policies. As understanding of the policies increases, it may be possible
to formulate some general principle which will satisfactorily handle
the majority of cases involving this issue but which, for want of sufficient knowledge, must remain subject to one or more indeterminate
exceptions. Experience should eventually develop to the point where
it is possible to attempt with some confidence to state a precise rule of
law.
Development of satisfactory choice of law rules has been greatly
impeded by the initial attempt to regulate vast areas by a few all61 See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
62 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 4, at 22-23 (4th ed. 1971).

A law favorable to the plaintiff was applied, for example, in all of the tort cases
cited in notes 5 and 7-9 with the exception of Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d
792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
63
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embracing rules which bore little relation to the underlying policies
and worked badly in practice. These rules have now largely been abandoned, and an attempt to construct new rules must be made. In all
probability, these rules will be far more numerous and far narrower
than their predecessors.
We have probably reached the stage where most areas of choice
of law can be covered by general principles which are subject to imprecise exceptions. We should press on, however, beyond these principles to the formulation of precise rules. A choice of law rule that
works well in the great majority of situations should be applied even
in a case where it might not reach ideal results. Good rules, like other
advantages, have their price.

